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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
JUDICIAL DEFINITION
OF MATERIALITY
Abstract: Determining what should be considered a material item has
been a problem for both the accounting profession and the courts. By
reviewing the court cases involving the issue of materiality, the authors have determined where differences in the materiality standard
as applied by the courts exist. The judicial definition of materiality has
developed over time, and current trends with important variations are
observed. Based upon the authors' analysis, the following judicial definition of materiality, with its possible variations, is suggested: Would
the reasonable (or speculative) investor (or layman) consider important (or be influenced by) this information in determining his course
of action?

Finding a general definition for materiality has been difficult
for both the accounting profession and the courts of the United
States. The courts have been criticized for not developing a concise definition of materiality. [Reckers, et. al., 1985; Jeffries, 1981].
However, the accounting profession itself has not been able to
precisely define what is or is not material. Without an all-purpose
definition of materiality, the courts have grappled with its meaning on a case-by-case basis. The result has been confusion over
some elements of the definition. This paper will review the cases
involving materiality and the evolution of the definition of materiality in the courts. Based upon an analysis of the court opinions,
the varying standards which have been applied by the courts will
be explained.
THE ACCOUNTANTS VIEW OF MATERIALITY
Accountants have recognized that the profession would benefit if a general definition of materiality could be developed. In
1973, the issue of materiality was one of the original items for
consideration by the newly-formed Financial Accounting StanPublished by eGrove, 1990
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dards Board (FASB). The Board's conclusions on materiality criteria were issued in 1980 in its Statement of Financial Accounting
Concepts (SFAC) No. 2, "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information." The FASB announced that it would not attempt to
codify basic rules for materiality, stating, "The Board's present
position is that no general standards of materiality can be formulated to take into account all the considerations that enter into an
experienced human judgment" [FASB, 1980, p. xiii]. The Board
instead issued this general definition of materiality:
The magnitude of an omission or misstatement of accounting information that, in the light of surrounding
circumstances, makes it probable that the judgment of a
reasonable person relying on the information would have
been changed or influenced by the omission or misstatement [FASB, 1980, p. xv].
Even though the FASB gives a subjective definition, accountants tend to quantify the concept of materiality. According to
SFAC No. 2, "Materiality judgments are primarily quantitative in
nature. They pose the question: Is this item large enough for users
of the information to be influenced by it?" Research has established that most accountants view materiality in terms of net income, usually 5 to 10 percent [Pattillo and Siebel, 1974; Slipp,
1983].
Objective accounting standards for material items have been
established for a few limited issues. For example, Accounting Principles Board Opinion (APB) No. 15 states that a reduction in earnings per share of less than three percent will not be material, such
that the computation of diluted earnings per share will not be
required.
MATERIALITY IN THE COURTS
If accountants have had difficulty in formulating a general
definition for materiality, it should not be surprising that the
courts of the United States have applied varying standards for
materiality. Like the profession, the courts have been required to
determine what is material in each situation that is brought before
a tribunal.
Common Law
The application of a legal standard of materiality to accountants is drawn from the common law of torts. Accountants have
been sued for supplying misleading information under the comhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol17/iss2/7
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mon law remedies for misrepresentation and fraud. The Restatement of Torts 2d (1988) defines materiality in cases of fraudulent
misrepresentation as follows:
§ 538(2) The matter is material if (a) a reasonable man
would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question; or (b) the maker of the representation knows or
has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely
to regard the matter as important in determining his
choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so
regard it.
Comments to this section of the Restatement provide that the
materiality decision is a question of fact which is a "matter of
judgment." Like the accounting profession, the common law recognizes that materiality must be determined on a case-by-case
basis. An item is material under common law if "a reasonable man
would have regarded the fact misrepresented to be important in
determining his course of action" [Restatement § 538, Comment
(e)].
Securities Laws
The Security Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 created criminal and civil liability for certain actions and omissions. The Acts
use the term "material" to describe the offenses involving misleading information, but never define what is material. Security regulations have attempted to give some guidance, stating
The term 'material' when used to qualify a requirement
for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits
the information required to those matters which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed
before purchasing the security registered [17 C.F.R.
§230.405(1) and 240.12b-2, 1984].
It is under the securities acts that the courts have most often
been asked to interpret the materiality of financial information.
The courts' definition of materiality has varied depending upon
the particular statute or regulation involved and the facts of each
case.
Evolution of Materiality in Case Law
Cases in which materiality has been an issue fall into three
main categories, (1) trading on insider information, (2) omissions
from financial or registration statements, and (3) omissions from
Published by eGrove, 1990
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proxy materials. While not all of these cases have involved accountants, each has contributed to the definition of materiality in the
courts.
Insider Trading. An early case involving trading on insider information is Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., [73 F.Supp. 798
(E.D.Pa. 1947)]. In this case, a corporation was owned equally by
four shareholders, two of whom served as officers. The two officers purchased the stock holdings of the other two shareholders
without informing them that negotiations for the sale of the company had begun. Whether the pending sale was a material fact was
an important issue in the case. The court stated that information
was material if it would "affect the judgment of the other party to
the transaction."
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., [340 F.2d 457 (Cir. 2, 1965), cert,
den. 382 U.S. 811], involved a similar insider trading allegation,
with insiders purchasing the shares of a minority shareholder after information concerning a possible sale of the corporation became available. The court further developed the definition of materiality, stating,
The proper test is whether the plaintiff would have been
influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact. To put
the matter conversely, insiders 'are not required to search
out details that presumably would not influence the
person's judgment with whom they are dealing.' Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (Cir. 7, 1963).
Financial or registration statements. Accountants are most often defendants in cases which involve omissions from financial
statements. An important case in this area is Escott v. Barchris
Construction Corp., [283 F.Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)]. In this
case, a number of items were found to have been misstated in the
financial statements of the corporation. These items included an
overstatement of sales and income, an understatement of liabilities, and the omission of information concerning officer loans and
delinquent customer accounts. In a controversial decision, the
court found that some of the omissions were material, while others of similar magnitude were not. Overstatement of earnings per
share by about 15% was found not be material. At the same time,
balance sheet errors which resulted in a current ration of 1.9:1,
which if correctly stated would have been 1.6:1 were held to be
material.1 In making the materiality determination, the court de1Fora

critical discussion of the result see Briloff (1972), pp. 53-54.
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fined "materiality" as those matters which
an investor needs to know before he can make an intelligent, informed decision
The average prudent investor
is not concerned with minor inaccuracies or with errors
as to matters which are not of interest to him. The facts
which tend to deter him from purchasing a security are
facts which have an important bearing upon the nature
or condition of the issuing corporation or its business.
Proxy Statements. The Supreme Court of the United States has
most often considered materiality under the Securities Acts in determining the validity of proxy solicitations. Important examples of the Supreme Court decisions involving proxies include:
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, [377 U.S. 426 (1964)]; Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co., [396 U.S. 375 (1970)]; TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., [426 U.S. 438 (1976)]. The facts of these proxy cases are
similar, with a proposed corporate merger or acquisition as the
subject of the controversy. In the Mills case, the Supreme Court, in
dicta, made the following statement defining materiality:
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown to be 'material,' as it was found to
be here, that determination itself indubitably embodies a
conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it
might have been considered important by a reasonable
shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to
vote [Emphasis added.] [396 U.S. 375, 384.]
This statement caused confusion in the lower courts when applying the materiality standard.2 In TSC Industries v. Northway, the
Supreme Court clarified the definition of materiality in proxy
statement cases. The standard of disclosure is not those items
which might be considered important to a shareholder. Instead,
the Supreme Court defined materiality under this securities regulation as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . It does not require
proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the
omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor
to change his vote [Emphasis added.] [426 U.S. 406, 409.]

2In Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 597 (Cir. 5, 1974), the lower
court discusses the problems with the Mills definition.
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JUDICIAL DEFINITION OF MATERIALITY
There remain differences in the definition of materiality as
applied by the courts. These differences can be summarized as
follows:
1) Would the information have actually influenced the actions
of another or would the information only be considered
important to another?
2) Who must be affected by the error or omission, the average
investor or the reasonable layman?
3) Who must be affected by the error or omission, the prudent
investor or the speculative investor?
In Table 1, the variations in the elements of the definition, as
interpreted by the courts in selected cases, are presented.
An analysis of past court cases reveals that these differences
depend, for the most part, on the subject matter of the litigation
and the particular section or regulation under the securities laws
involved. However, trends which have developed over time can
also be seen.
Analysis of the Court-Derived Materiality Standard
"Influence" or "Important". In determining the standard for
materiality decisions, the courts have sometimes required that material information be significant enough that it would affect the
decision of the recipient of the information. Examples of these
cases include Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., supra; Kohler v.
Kohler Co., supra; List v. Fashion Park, supra; Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Company, [419 F.2d 787 (Cir. 2, 1969)].
In other cases, information has been held to be material if it
were important to the recipient in making his decision, regardless
of whether it would have caused him to act differently. Examples
of these cases include SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, [401 F.2d 833 (Cir.
2, 1967), cert. den. 394 U.S. 976]; Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, [406 U.S. 89 (1972)], Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite,
supra; TSC Industries v. Northway, supra. This "important" threshold test requires that additional information be revealed and places
a higher standard on accountants. While some controversy has
existed over whether information which "might" be considered
important or which "would" be considered important should be
revealed, the Supreme Court clarified the standard in TSC Industries v. Northway. In that case, the Court declared that only the
information which would be considered important should be required.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol17/iss2/7
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Table 1
Opinions on the Elements of Materiality
"Influence"
v.
"Important"

"Layman"
v.
"Investor"

Influence
or Important

Layman

Prudent

Important

Layman

Prudent

Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
Cir. 7, 1963 (131)

Influence

Layman

Prudent

List v. Fashion Park,
Cir. 2, 1965 (266)

Influence

Layman

Prudent

Escott v. Barchris
Construction Corp.,
S.D.N.Y., 1968 (61)

Influence

Investor

Prudent

SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, S.Ct.,
1968 (565)

Important

Investor

Speculative

Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite, S.Ct.,
1970 (827)

Important

Investor

Prudent

Gerstle v. GambleSkogmo, Cir. 2,
1973 (143)

Influence

Investor

Prudent

Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co.,
Cir. 5, 1974 (147)

Important

Layman

Prudent

TSC Industries v.
Northway, S.Ct.,
1976 (597)

Important

Investor

Prudent

Accounting Profession
SFAC No. 2

Common Law
Restatement of Torts

"Speculative"
v.
"Prudent"

Court Cases Under
Securities Laws*

* This list of cases is not intended to be inclusive, but to provide a representative
sample only. The number in parenthesis indicates the number of cases which
have cited each case, as determined by LEXIS search. These high numbers of
citations are indicative of the importance of these cases.
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Table 1, which summarizes the positions of the courts, reveals
a trend over time. The courts appear to be moving away from the
standard that information must influence another's actions in order to be material. Instead, the more recent decisions have required that any important information be considered material.
While this places a higher burden on the accounting profession, at
least the Supreme Court has refused to apply an even higher standard which would require disclosure of all information which
might be considered important.3
"Investor" or "Layman". The common law standard for misrepresentation is that of the hypothetical "reasonable man." This
standard has sometimes been adopted by the courts in applying
the definition of materiality to financial information.4 As stated by
the court in Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
. . . the test of materiality is 'whether a reasonable man
would attach importance to the fact misrepresented in
determining his course of action.' This definition, born of
the Restatement of Torts, § 538(2)(a), has a rich history of
application to the securities laws. [Citations omitted.] It
has not been and should not be discarded as a standard.
[489 F.2d 579, 604 (Cir. 5, 1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 873].
The courts have also applied the standard of the "average
prudent investor." Under this standard, the user of financial information can be assumed to have some basic knowledge of investment activities.5 Whether this is a higher or lower standard than
that of the "reasonable man" depends on the facts. In some situations, a layman might require a more thorough explanation of the
activities of a company. At other times, a knowledgeable investor
might demand that more information be disseminated.
Again, a trend over time appears to have developed under the
securities laws. Recent cases tend to apply the standard of the
"average prudent investor."
"Prudent" or "Speculative". In some special situations, an even
higher standard of materiality may be required. In SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., supra, the materiality of reports on mining explorations which were not disclosed to the public prior to in3Note that the Supreme Court cases which have recently ruled in the area of
materiality have all considered misinformation or omissions in proxy statements
under Rule 14a-9 of the securities regulations. It is possible that a different
standard could apply if another topic were considered.
4For a discussion of the layman and the securities acts, see Kripke (1973).
5Jennings, et. al. (1985) discuss this difference in the application of the rule.
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sider purchases was in dispute. Relying upon the legislative history
of the securities acts, the court stated that this information "would
certainly have been an important fact to a reasonable, if speculative, investor in deciding whether he should buy, sell, or hold."
[401 F.2d 833, 850 (1968)].
While the definition of materiality applied by the court in
Texas Gulf Sulphur is unusual, it should not be ignored.6 Because
materiality decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, all the facts
and circumstances of a company must be considered. As stated by
the court,
whether facts are material . . . will depend at any given
time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of
the event in light of the totality of the company activity.
[401 F.2d 833, 849(1968)].
Summary of the Judicial Definition of Materiality
From an analysis of judicial decisions, the best general definition of materiality which can be developed is that items will be
material if the average prudent investor would consider the information important in evaluating his course of action. However,
variations of this definition can occur, depending on the facts and
circumstances of each case and the issue involved. Accountants
should keep in mind these possible variations of the materiality
standard in the courts. Taking these less often applied variations
into consideration, the judicial test for materiality is better stated
as follows: Would the average reasonable [or speculative] investor
[or layman] consider important [or be influenced by] this information in determining his course of action.
CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
The accounting profession and the judicial system have had
difficulty in formulating a general definition of materiality. Both
recognize that decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis.
However, accountants and the courts approach the problem differently. Accountants tend to evaluate information quantitatively. Decisions as to materiality are made in terms of the comparative
magnitude of the information. The courts apply a qualitative stan-

6For

a critical discussion of the result, see Kripke (1971).
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dard, looking at the use of the information by the readers of financial statements. For the courts, the magnitude of the item may be
one factor to consider in determining materiality, but it is not a
controlling factor.
Accountants may be unsettled by what appears to be a lack of
uniformity in the courts when defining materiality. However, the
U.S. judicial system causes some of the differences evident in the
court cases. When courts in various jurisdictions are approached
to determine issues of materiality, different precedents are set.
Only the standards set in the decisions of the Supreme Court are
applied universally. Another factor which creates differences in
court cases is that materiality has been an issue in many types of
cases. In making materiality determinations, the courts have scrutinized various statutes and regulations within the body of the
securities laws. This paper has concentrated on the definition of
materiality in the courts and has not investigated the varying nuances evident in different sections of the securities act and regulations. Thus, the problem with the varying standards of materiality
may lie within the regulations and not with the evaluation by the
courts.
Because materiality is determined based upon the facts and
circumstances of each case, differences in its application can be
expected to continue. The courts might be more likely to apply a
universal standard if the accounting profession could first develop
a specific definition to be applied. As stated by the court in U.S. v.
Simon, [425 F.2d 796, 807 (Cir. 2, 1969)]:
We do not think the jury was also required to accept the
accountants' evaluation whether a given fact was material, at least not when the accountants' testimony was not
based on specific rules or prohibitions to which they
could point, but only on the need for the auditor to make
an honest judgment... [Emphasis added.]
As long materiality decisions are made on a case-by-case basis
under different common and statutory law standards, differences
in the application of the rule by the courts will continue.
Even though the accounting profession has developed its own
view of materiality, the judicial definition cannot be ignored. In
today's litigious society, if an accountant's judgment is questioned,
the ultimate determination of proper treatment is often made by
the courts. To avoid legal liability, accountants must comply with
the common law definition of materiality as it has evolved. Therefore, accountants are compelled to adopt the judicial definition of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol17/iss2/7
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materiality, though it may not always agree with the profession's
conceptual framework of accounting.
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